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This article is about the activity of risk assessment 
in developing KFX/IFX Fighters through joint 
development cooperation between Indonesia and 
South Korea for Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development Phase (EMDP). The Risks in EMDP 
found by using the Life Cycle of Weapon System. 
Risk assessment aims to identify, analyze and 
assess the level of risk as a calculation so that the 
program will always be on the track and the 
default of the project will be avoided. Moreover, 
this is the first experience for Indonesia to make 
fighters. Besides that, KFX/IFX fighters is one of 
our national program which aims to build the 
independence of defense industry and to open the 
road map in mastering on making fighter for PT. 
Dirgantara Indonesia (PT. DI). 
Artikel ini membahas tentang kegiatan penilaian 
risiko dalam mengembangkan KFX/IFX Fighters 
melalui kerjasama pengembangan kerjasama 
antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan untuk Tahap 
Pengembangan Teknik dan Manufaktur 
(Manufacturing Development Phase/EMDP). 
Resiko dalam EMDP ditemukan dengan 
menggunakan Life Cycle of Weapon System. 
Penilaian risiko bertujuan untuk mengidentifikasi, 
menganalisis dan menilai tingkat risiko sebagai 
penghitungan sehingga program akan selalu 
berada di jalur dan default proyek akan dihindari. 
Apalagi, inilah pengalaman pertama bagi 
Indonesia untuk membuat pejuang. Selain itu, 
pejuang KFX/IFX merupakan salah satu program 
nasional kami yang bertujuan untuk membangun 
industri pertahanan dan membuka peta jalan untuk 
menguasai tempur PT. Dirgantara Indonesia (PT. 
DI). 
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Introduction 
The advancement of 
technology and science is the main 
driving force for the creation of 
change. With the technology that 
disseminates so fast to make the 
world community open themselves 
more and the influence of technology 
can penetrate the boundaries of the 
territory of state power.  
The depletion of these limits 
creates a variety of excesses in the 
joints of the state so that defence 
technology is required. The 
development of defence and research 
technology becomes the main 
gateway to independence. In response 
to new security threats in innovative 
technological development (Neuman, 
2010). 
In the procurement 
conception of defense acquisition, 
defense equipment can be fulfilled by 
way of purchasing (off the self) or 
make their own. The option of buying 
may not continue to be done by 
Indonesia so that a joint development 
cooperation with a certain Cost Share 
is a rational choice to be taken in 
anticipation of a number of typical 
problems encompassing the world of 
defense technology research and 
development, such as limited defense 
budget and lack of expertise in 
creating products and expensive 
research and development costs.  
Based on the formal legal 
construction set forth in Law No. 18 
of 2002 on the National System of 
Research, Development and 
Application of Science and 
Technology which provides sufficient 
space to integrate research and 
technology development, so that 
stakeholders can give a clear 
direction, priority and policy about 
defense technology (Karim, 2014).  
Policy related science and 
technology, according to 
Parthasarathy (2010) there are many 
proposals incorporate citizen 
participation in science and 
technology policy (Anderson & 
Jaeger, 1999; Durant, 1999; Ferretti & 
Pavone, 2009; Fischer, 1999; Guston 
& Sarewitz, 2002; Rayner, 2003). 
Defense technology can be 
developed independently or in 
collaboration with other parties. 
Researchers have discussed the 
various determinants of collaboration 
(Becker & Dietz, 2004; Montoro, 
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Mora & Guerras, 2006), including 
external recruitment and payment, 
innovation categories, firm size and 
location (Becker & Dietz, 2004; 
Fritsch & Lukas, 2001; López , 2008), 
capabilities and competencies 
possessed by certain sectors in the 
collaboration process (Fiaz, 2013), 
previous collaboration or association 
relationships (Gulati, 1995; Kim & 
Song, 2007). In the context of policy 
implementation on defense 
technology, a combat aircraft 
development program undertaken 
with South Korea has been 
established by the government as one 
of the 7 (seven) national programs 
prioritized.  
The program can open a 
roadmap for fighter technology 
mastery for the defense industry (PT. 
Dirgantara Indonesia) to increase its 
capability to achieve independence. 
In addition, the embodiment of 
research institutions and the 
development of defense technology 
can be actualized in the Design Center 
Indonesia (DCI) activities as a crater 
of knowledge to finalize the fighter-
making project so that its 
implementation practices can be 
realized as well as possible. 
In the Minister of Defense 
Regulation of the Indonesia Republic 
Number 6 of 2016 on the 
Implementation of the IF-X Fighter 
Development Program, Article 1 is 
explicitly stated that the IF-X Fighter 
is a long-term and inter-year national 
program implemented with the aim of 
enhancing the ability of Indonesia to 
master technology and the 
development of fighter aircraft.  
For Indonesia, this is the first 
aircraft fighter-making project that 
creates vulnerability to risk, moreover 
there are also quite high disparities, 
especially in terms of technology 
between Indonesia and South Korea. 
This may give birth to a gap that must 
be resolved in order not to delay the 
project. Basically, any project will 
definitely have a risk. Therefore, the 
risk assessment is absolutely 
necessary to be done at each stage in 
order to avoid the failure of the joint 
development project. 
The development program of 
KFX/IFX Combat Aircraft consists of 
3 (three) phases, namely; Technology 
Development Phase (TDP), 
Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development Phase (EMDP) and 
Production Phase (PP). The focus of 
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the research is to conduct risk 
assessment activities on the EMDP 
Stage because at this stage is within 
the core work to realize the 
production of fighter aircraft.  
However, because the period 
is very long and not over, the authors 
studied it by studying TDP as an early 
reference for entering the EMDP 
Stage and observing the ongoing 
EMDP process. The author also 
reviews aspects of the Life Cycle of 
Weapon System to see estimates of 
risks in EMDP, although the TDP's 
results are not significantly 
influenced because of some changes 
in EMDP involving industries from 
both countries (PT.Dirgantara 
Indonesia and Korean Aerospace 
Industry).  
However, the TDP remains 
important as it is the first foothold in 
the development of the KFX/IFX 
Combat Aircraft. This is clearly stated 
in the provisions of the Regulation on 
the IF-X in the third part of 
Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development Stage article 5, 
paragraph 4, stating that all activities 
of the IFM-XM Stage should refer to 
the results achieved at the Technology 
Development Phase (TDP). 
The Engineering and 
Manufacture Development Phase 
(EMDP) stages include: preliminary 
design, detail design, detail part 
manufacturing, sub and final 
assembly, ground and  flight  test, and 
certification. Implementation of 
EMDP is based on Work Share and 
Cost Share agreed by the Government 
of Indonesia and the 'South Korean 
government. The Work Share consists 
of Engineering Work Package 
(EWP), Airframe Component 
Manufacturing and participation in 
prototype and flight test. 
The author then collects 
questionnaires that have been filled 
by the respondents and calculate the 
results using a scale of 1 s/d 6. 
Ranking of the scale is as follows; 
1 = Lowest (ineffective) 
2 = Very Low (less effective) 
3 = Low (somewhat effective) 
4 = Quite high (effective) 
5 = High (very effective) 
6 = Very High (most effective) 
Delphi survey is conducted 
with 2 (two) iterations (repetition) so 
that it can reach a concession together 
and can be accounted for its validity. 
The views of these experts are then 
Salsabiela, Midhio, and Amperiawan/ Risk Assessment in Developing KFX/IFX Fighter/ 101-122 
105 
 
adjusted according to the real 
situation so as to produce a near-term 
approximation of the current and 
future situation at the EMDP stage. 
The results of this study found that the 
technological aspect is the dominant 
risk or the highest in terms of 
political, economic and procurement 
organizations. 
 
Figure 1. Assesment of The Aspect in Life Cycle of Weapon System (Source: 
Writer’s Deduction) 
 
Result and Discussion 
Under the terms of the 
Minister Of Defense Regulation on 
IF-X, Article 6 stipulates that the 
implementation of EMDP takes place 
since 2015 to 2023 and in paragraph 2 
of Article 7 discusses the prototype of 
the aircraft in which the results of the 
PRM I-FX stage activities include 6 
(six) flying prototypes And 2 (two) 
prototypes did not fly. One of the 
flying prototypes must be submitted 
to the government through the 
Ministry of Defense. The prototype is 
a configuration for IF-X so that the 
development of flight test with the 
specific configuration required by 
Indonesia and all production activities 
of the prototype should involve the 
Government. Here the government 
holds the key to becoming a captain 
who brings together joint 
development cooperation in order to 
stay in the right track and can be 
realized with good results.  
Life Cycle of Weapon System 
The author uses the Life 
Cycle of Weapon System as an 
Political aspect: 
1. National political situation of both Nation. 
2. Relationship between countries especially 
South-East Asians 
3. Politics of United States in project KFX/IFX 
Economic aspect: 
1. Budget (Guns versus Butter) 
2. Lack of coordination of K/L 
Accusation of organization aspect: 
1. Lack of coordination among K/L 
Technological aspect: 
1. TRL for KFX/IFX is generation 4-5 
2. TAA is yet to be approved and DTSS is in 
development. 
3. Operational requirement. 
Joint development of KFX/IFX Aircraft 
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analytical tool to identify the problem 
of the complexity of the current 
EMDP process with an expert 
judgment. Various problems are 
found from the political climate, the 
state of the economy, the organization 
for acquisition and technology of 
availability are examined globally 
and comprehensively. Life Cycle of 
Weapon System description is 
described in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Life Cycle of Weapon System (Source: Johnson, 2005) 
 
Johnson (2005) points out 
that in the world of weaponry, the 
availability of technology must be 
used to meet requirements through 
trade of study, developing technical 
information in making decisions 
related to the selected weapon and 
properly supervising the course of  the 
acquisition system, while the 
acquisition organization functions to 
operate or manifest the weapon to be 
maintained up to 20-25 years of 
supply, taking into account the 
aspects of mission, maintenance, 
spare parts, upgrading and the skills 
and availability of personnel.  
From the economic side, 
changing needs will be followed by 
increased capabilities that demand 
funding, such as the need for weapon 
modification to follow the times need 
enormous cost and it must be met. 
Herein lies the political aspect that 
plays a role to determine the needs 
assessment of the selected weaponry. 
 
Obsolescence/ 
Retirement 
Assess Need 
Acquire 
Capability 
Operate/ 
Sustan 
Technology 
Availability 
Organization for 
Acquisition 
Political 
Climate 
State of the  
Economy 
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Risk Assessment of EMDP 
The analysis used by the 
author is the theory of the Risk 
Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition as a guideline used in the 
United States Department of Defense.  
The scope of risk assessment 
is only limited from risk 
identification, risk analysis to risk 
mitigation planning activities as an 
effort to handle the risks found. This 
guideline begins with planning of the 
program and its implementation 
schedule as the beginning of risk 
management being carried out, this 
step is continued with risk assessment 
activities. In addition to the 
application concept of Life Cycle of 
Weapon System, the author uses Risk 
Assessment theory written by 
Newsome (2014) which consists of 
the following activities; 
1. Risk Identification is the process 
of discovering, recognizing and 
recording existing risks. This 
process is systematically and 
continuously conducted to 
identify potential risks or losses to 
the project. 
2. Risk Analysis Is the process of 
dealing with risks and 
determining levels and 
understanding the context of its 
relationship with the source of 
risk and Assessment is calculating 
the relative scale, level, or risk 
rating.  
3. This risk assessment can be 
informal, unconscious and 
routine. External sources of this 
assessment may come from 
subject matter experts, systematic 
predictions and structured 
judgment, ie; using the delphi 
survey method, ordinal ranking 
and plotting likelihood and 
returns.  
The combination of the 
theory used can strengthen the 
author's argument about the risks 
occurring at the EMDP stage with the 
Life Cycle of Weapon System aspect 
and get the highest risk and become 
the main vigilance so that the 
immediate form of solution must be 
solved so that the risk does not have 
the potential to disrupt the 
smoothness the course of the program 
in the present and future. 
Risk Identification and Analysis 
Activity of EMDP 
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The process mechanism at 
the ongoing EMDP stage when 
viewed from the 4 (four) aspects of 
the Life Cycle of Weapon System is 
still going well up to now, but because 
the tempo of EMDP work takes a very 
long time, from 2015 to 2026 (Based 
on project milestones), so we need to 
be aware of the risks. 
Therefore, it is necessary to 
list the risks of these various aspects 
of the review by observing ongoing 
events that could potentially be a risk, 
as well as risk estimation at the 
EMDP stage. The risk estimation here 
is related to the problem in the real 
situation occurring from the Life 
Cycle of Weapon System aspect.  
For identification and risk 
analysis activities, the authors begins 
by using questionnaires and 
interviews of experts comprised of 
policy makers, actors, academics, 
diplomats and international political 
observers to identify what are the 
risks of the Life Cycle of Weapon 
System. 
From the expert judgment, 
the researcher will get an estimate of 
the general description of risks from 
the current and ongoing EMDP stages 
until 2026. 
It is expected to provide 
guidance on specific systematic 
information dynamics that can be 
used to analyze risks and assess and 
prepare mitigation actions in the face 
of those risks. The goal of risk 
identification is the risk register 
developed from risk sources (Life 
Cycle of Weapon System aspect 
review) and is an ongoing issue and 
an expected problem that may occur 
in the future in the EMDP Stages.  
The list of risks to the 
development of the KFX/IFX Combat 
Aircraft is seen from a review of the 4 
(four) aspects of the Life Cycle of 
Weapon System (political, economic, 
procurement organization and 
technology) as shown in Figure 1. 
The items in the Political 
Life Cycle of Weapon System review 
(the political situation between the 
two countries, the relations between 
countries in the region and the United 
States project in the KFX/IFX 
Project), the economic (budget and 
inter-ministerial or agency 
coordination). 
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In terms of procurement 
organizations (coordination between 
ministries or agencies, the role of 
KKIP) and technological aspects 
(TRL for the KFX/IFX Combat 
Aircraft is a sophisticated 4.5 
generation, no TAA approval and 
differences regarding opsreq from 
both countries) have been obtained 
from interviews with competent 
experts. 
Technological Aspect as the 
Dominant Risk 
Based on the analysis used, 
after the risk assessment activity is 
done, the next step is to make a plan 
to address the risks found through the 
abatement plan. In the abatement plan 
will be decided together that the risk 
will be faced or avoided so that 
mitigation planning can be done and 
also consider how the impact of the 
decision to be taken.  
From the research result, 
technological alertness is the highest 
risk so it needs to be examined 
holistically. The first problem is the 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
for the KFX/IFX Combat Aircraft is a 
sophisticated 4.5 generation and 
Indonesia has not experienced 
making fighter aircraft so that 
Indonesia should be able to increase 
TRL in line with industrial readiness 
level. If that is not immediately done, 
then this problem will have an impact 
on the lack of optimal mastery of 
technology making the KFX/IFX 
Combat.  
Efforts to increase TRL are 
especially done on areas that will 
support this fighter project (eg in 
structural areas, aerodynamics, air 
combat systems, etc.) are not 
maximized since it was only started in 
2013 so that its internal mitigation 
form is increasing capability of 
PT.DI, either through the quality of its 
human resources, as well as the 
facilities available.  
Implementers of this 
mitigation not only belong to PT.DI 
alone so that strict coordination from 
all parties (ministries and agencies) is 
needed so that the objectives can be 
achieved, especially for the Program 
Management Unit (PMU) that 
manages the project.  
The PMU includes PT.DI as 
a defense industry that knows clearly 
the specifications required by its 
company as the implementer of this 
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EMDP stage with KAI. For example; 
Preparation of human resources, 
laboratory and construction of project 
supporting facilities and PT.DI also 
contemplates strategic investment to 
encourage the growth of 
industrialization in the long term so 
that PT.DI will act as lead integrator.  
While the mitigation is 
Human Resources (HR) that is sent by 
PT.DI to participate in South Korea 
should be able to absorb the science 
of making combat aircraft and 
transfer knowledge into the country, 
so it takes a certain level of industry 
readiness to overcome. 
This complicated problem 
while PT.DI increases its TRL in all 
areas. The core implementer of this 
mitigation is PT.DI, but needs to be 
supported by all parties so that the 
results may be optimal. 
The second problem is about 
the absence of approval from the 
United States government to 
Lockheed Martin to provide technical 
assistance. Joint cooperation between 
Indonesia and South Korea also 
involves the United States as a 
technology provider that will be 
applied to the KFX/IFX Combat 
Aircraft because not all of its products 
come from South Korea. Its radar, 
engine and avionics are the product of 
Lockheed Martin as an offset of the 
purchase of 40 F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter Lightning II aircraft. Because 
there are products from the United 
States, then South Korea must ask 
permission first to the United States to 
share knowledge with Indonesia.  
While Lockheed Martin as a 
technologist who must also follow the 
applicable procedures in Uncle Sam's 
Country and request an approval 
request to the United States 
Government regarding the Technical 
Assistance Agreement (TAA) or a 
form of assistance from Lockheed 
Martin for the technology to be 
adopted into the KFX/IFX Combat 
Aircraft.  
The United States 
government must grant Lockheed 
Martin permission to transfer his 
knowledge to South Korea that will 
share knowledge with Indonesia.  
Until now, TAA has yet to 
sign and the United States 
government also asked Indonesia to 
immediately have Defense 
Technology Security System (DTSS), 
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namely: a technological safeguard 
system that if Indonesia gained 
knowledge from South Korea and the 
United States, Indonesia should be 
able to convince the American States 
that it will not leak to third parties.  
The DTSS is still 
constrained, in this case the legal 
umbrella in the form of existing law 
has not been fully regulated from top 
to bottom to develop a comprehensive 
mechanism and should also think 
about which government institutions 
will handle it.  
Meanwhile, in view of 
Indonesia's cooperation partners, 
South Korea itself already has 
Directorate General Defense Security 
to take care of the country's security 
system well. This can serve as an 
example for Indonesia for its future 
implementation. 
Therefore, the form of 
internal mitigation that can be done is 
the full support of the government, 
especially the President as a state-man 
of this KFX/IFX Combat 
development project. 
The government should 
enhance cooperation with the United 
States in all fields including enhanced 
cooperation with Lockheed Martin in 
order to persuade the United States 
Government to immediately approve 
TAA.  
Therefore, the need for close 
coordination between ministries and 
institutions (such as the Ministry of 
Defense, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, PT.DI as the defense industry 
actors, etc.) to jointly enhance good 
relations with the United States in 
order to obtain agreement on TAA.  
The last issue is about the 
need for operational requirements 
(Opsreq) between the Air Force and 
ROKAF which can not be 
incorporated as a common 
requirement, fulfilled in a unique 
requirement for Indonesia and how 
specific differences can be addressed 
at the implementation level.  
The TDP results in a 
compromise that will unify end-user 
needs of both countries that must be 
met by industry players (PT.DI and 
KAI) with the selected technology. 
This technology must be able to 
combine in fulfilling opsreq, 
especially to pay attention to the 
fundamental differences between the 
two countries. The real impact of the 
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opsreq difference is the creation of 2 
(two) designs for Indonesia and South 
Korea in order to fulfill the 
irreconcilable differences.  
This requires strict escort by 
both countries in particular the role of 
the PMU, so that the two countries 
remain highly committed to 
developing fighter aircraft together, 
not on their own as a result of the 
opsreq differences.  
The role of the PMU is 
apparent in the TDP by bridging the 
intense encounter between the Air 
Force and the ROKAF to discuss 
opsreq and it has resulted in 
concessions for both. Therefore, the 
form of mitigation out of this issue is 
the absolute oversight done by both 
countries to guard the implementation 
practice in order to run well.  
The supervision should be 
done in the Government (G to G) 
realm with a strategic partnership 
framework that can further strengthen 
the cooperation, as well as from the 
Government to the executing industry 
(G to B) or conducted between the 
implementing industries (B to B).   
A table on technology risk 
estimation and its impact and 
mitigation form can be seen in Table 
1. 
Plans on Handling Technology 
Precaution 
The author pursed more 
specifically in making a plan of 
abatement (plan) so that the problem 
can be examined more clearly and 
comprehensively. Technological 
precautions include 3 (three) things, 
ie; 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
for the KFX/IFX Combat Aircraft 
is a Sophisticated 4.5 Generation 
Indonesia is not yet 
experienced in making fighter aircraft 
so that its for industry readiness to 
solve this complex problem. Tables 
on the identification of TRL rising 
risks and industry capabilities can be 
seen in Table 2.  
For optimal, the key lies in 
PT.DI capability and TRL 
improvement in all  areas. However, 
the  target  of  TRL achievement in 
particular and the mastery of this 
fighter achievement can be optimal, 
Indonesia must be able to increase 
TRL and eliminate technology 
disparity gap with South Korea. 
Therefore, there is a need technology 
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needs to be fully supported by the 
government because if the political 
support is lacking or the government 
to turn the direction by canceling this 
program, the implications of the loss 
are massive because not only judging 
in terms of material costs already 
incurred, But also many other things 
that can actually harm Indonesia's 
position when the cancellation is done 
in the middle of it. 
Table 1 Technological Aspect List of Risk 
No Probability Consequence Inward Mitigation 
Outward 
Mitigation 
1 Technology 
Readiness Level 
(TRL) for 
KFX/IFX is a 
sophisticated 4.5 
generation and 
Indonesia has 
never built a 
fighter 
Mastery fighter 
technology 
becomes less 
optimal 
Strengthen 
defense industry 
capability 
(Industry 
readiness) and 
improve TRL 
 
Executor: 
K/L Coordinator 
Absorb the 
science of making 
the KFX/IFX 
Combat Aircraft 
2 No approval yer 
of the Technical 
Assistance 
Agreement (TAA) 
from the United 
States 
Government to 
Lockheed Martin 
Data is not fully 
opened for all 
programs 
Support from the 
government 
 
Executor: 
Government 
Strengthen 
cooperation with 
the United State 
 
 
3 The existence of 
Operational 
Requirement 
(Opsreq) In Both 
Countries 
Two (2) designs 
are created and do 
not let the two 
countries run 
independently 
PMU 
Implementation 
Executor K/L 
Coordinator 
Supervision in 
particular by both 
countries (G to G) 
and (G to B) 
Source: Writer’s Deduction 
 
One of them is about the road 
map in mastering the fighter jet 
technology pioneered by Indonesia 
could experience failure again and it 
will have a wide impact on the level 
of absorption of labor will fall, even 
the target leverage in terms of mastery 
of this technology for the economy 
can be neglected just like that.  
Therefore, the government 
must fully support the sustainability 
of this national program and it 
certainly requires strong support from 
the House of Representatives, for 
example by issuing in the form of 
Law to further strengthen the essential 
position of joint development project 
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of the development of KFX/IFX 
Combat Aircraft. 
In addition to support, strict 
supervision is also required to lead the 
EMDP stage to run well. The 
government should be able to monitor 
the fulfillment of the program 
milestone not to retreat from the 
planned year. Even in the process do 
not let both countries change the 
technology that has been determined 
together thereby impacting the delay 
of the schedule resulting in cost 
swelling as well as the inclusion of 
more human resources to do it. The 
authors prepare a handling plan for 
the improvement of TRL and industry 
capabilities as below:
Table 2. Risk of Increasing TRL and Industrial Capabilities 
Date Identified : Date Reported:  
Update              :  
Risk                   : Increasing TRL and Industrial Capabilities 
Description:  
TRL for the KFX/IFX fighter jet is a 
sophisticated 4.5 generation and Indonesia has 
no experience in making fighter aircraft.  
Consequence : Less optimal mastery of combat 
aircraft manufacturing technology, if Indonesia 
is not able to follow the tech leap 
Risk Level:  
Main Executor: PT.DI 
Leader: PMU  
Source: Writer’s Deduction 
 
Table 3. Abatement Plan for TRL Improvement and Industrial Capability 
No Activity Executor Challenges Development 
1. Increase TRL in areas 
supporting the 
manufacture of fighter 
aircraft 
PT.DI There is a 
technology gap 
on the capabilities 
of Indonesia and 
South Korea 
Currently the area of the 
structure and aerodynamics 
are already at level 7, the 
weak areas are in the 
weapon system and strive 
to continue to be improved 
2. Improving the quality of 
human resources, 
especially personnel 
sent to participate in the 
KFX/IFX Combat 
development project 
PT.DI The ability or 
capacity of each 
person (HR) in 
absorbing the 
science is 
different as well 
as the 
specification of 
expertise 
PT.DI often provides 
training for the 
development of fighter 
aircraft 
SDM upgraded knowledge 
and expertise through 
scholarship 
3. Tackling labor issues 
that will retire and brain 
drain 
PT.DI Regeneration of 
human resources 
in PT.DI 
Future human resources 
can be taken from qualified 
universities 
4. Building hangars and 
supporting facilities for 
the manufacture of 
fighter aircraft 
PT.DI The addition of 
capital structures 
by the 
Government 
through APBN 
funding is often 
Coordination between 
ministries and agencies in 
particular the clear 
planning of the PMU by 
involving PT.DI who know 
the specifications of each 
requirements 
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No Activity Executor Challenges Development 
hampered by 
coordination 
5. Supporting strategic 
investment in order to 
empower local 
industries 
PT.DI 
along side 
PMU 
Still in process 
because the jet 
has yet to be 
finished 
New in the consolidation 
phase because it requires a 
long period of time and 
wait for the product jet, 
then the product will be 
developed independently 
with local components. 
Source: Writer’s Deduction 
 
The absence of Approval 
(Approval) for Technical 
Assistance Agreement (TAA) 
This can create a crucial 
problem that hampers the 
development of the KFX/IFX Combat 
Engine. Lockheed Martin will 
provide knowledge to South Korea on 
the offset of purchase of F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter Lightning II aircraft 
which later with the technology will 
be adopted to the KFX/IFX Combat 
Aircraft where South Korea work 
together Indonesia as a joint 
development partner of the fighter's 
development.  
The United States 
government then asked Indonesia to 
build a Defense Technology Security 
System (DTSS) so that when given 
science by Lockheed Martin, the 
science will not be leaked to third 
parties and until now DTSS is still 
being built by Indonesia. The table on 
risk identification of TAA can be seen 
in Table 4. 
Unopened data for Export 
Lisense (EL) related components is 
the core technology of the fighter. 
Therefore, Indonesia should 
undertake a series of direct and 
indirect approaches to the United 
States Parties. 
Table 4. Identification of Risk Management Regarding TAA 
Date Identified : Date Reported:  
Update              :  
Risk                   : TAA has yet been approved 
Description: Lockheed Martin has not yet been 
approved to provide technical assistance to 
Indonesia working with South Korea in the 
creation of the KFX/IFX Combat Aircraft 
 
Consequence : Data not opened for EL related 
components 
Risk Level :  
Executor: K/L Coordinator  
Leader: Government 
Source: Writer’s Deduction 
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A to-the-point approach is to 
increase Indonesia's cooperation with 
Lockheed Martin so that the giant 
company wants to persuade its 
government to immediately approve 
TAA. Indonesia also has to build 
DTSS comprehensively.  
Indonesia is currently 
building DTSS and in its development 
process, Indonesia should be able to 
convince the US that its development 
process is in accordance with standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). 
Indonesia realizes that the nature of 
armaments is highly confidential so 
that Indonesia will maintain strict 
confidentiality.  
Indirect approach can be 
done by obtaining credit points in the 
eyes of the United States so that the 
American attitude can soften, for 
example Indonesia must always 
support anti-terrorism and uphold the 
values of democracy.  
Indonesia should not take a 
counter position with American 
policy so that when the Indonesian 
Party asks Lockheed Martin to inquire 
about TAA, his hope TAA can be 
immediately approved by the 
American government.  
Indonesia must also be good 
at exploiting existing gaps with its 
strengths, for example the United 
States needs strong countries in Asia, 
so that Indonesia as one of the major 
countries in this region should 
increase its strength and even be a 
center of gravity in area.  
This will make Indonesia an 
increasingly important position for 
the United States, let alone our region 
is an area traversed by international 
logistics. Here we can take an active 
role by enhancing security to 
safeguard our shipping traffic so that 
the United States will find it helpful.  
This will certainly 
increasingly tighten the relationship 
between Indonesia and the United 
States. The author prepares a handling 
plan for TAA as in Table 5. 
The existence of Operational 
Requirement (Opsreq) in Both 
Countries 
The last technological issue 
concerns the need for operational 
requirements (opreq) between TNI 
AU and ROKAF that can not be 
incorporated in the common 
requirement, fulfilled in the unique 
requirements for Indonesia and how 
the specific differences can be 
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overcome at the level of 
implementation of the concessions 
generated in the TDP for the 
technology that must be able to be 
realized by both defense industry 
especially for PT.DI. The table on risk 
identification of Opsreq needs in both 
countries can be seen in Table 6. 
Table 5. Abatement Plan for TAA 
No Activity Executor Challenges Development 
1. Fostering good 
relations with the 
United States 
through a direct 
approach  
All Parties TAA has yet to 
approved 
The US government 
wants Indonesia to 
have DTSS so it 
should be built as 
soon as possible 
a. Cooperating 
with Americans 
in all fields 
Coordination of 
Ministries and 
Institutions 
America has yet 
consider Indonesia a 
strong nation 
Improve strategic 
partnership with the 
United States 
b. Fostering good 
relations with 
Lockheed 
Martin 
Coordination of 
Ministries and 
Institutions 
Lack of connection 
with Lockheed 
Martin 
An intense approach 
was made with 
Lockheed Martin in 
order to persuade 
the US Government 
to immediately 
approve TAA 
2 Fostering good 
relations with the 
United States 
through an indirect 
approach 
Coordination of 
Ministries and 
Institutions 
Indonesia has not 
earned enough 
credit points in the 
eyes of America 
Supporting anti-
terrorism and 
upholding 
democratic values, 
Indonesia should not 
take a counter 
position with US 
policy. Helping the 
stability of the 
region, can be a 
bridge to the Islamic 
world. 
Source: Writer’s Deduction 
 
Table 6. Risk Identification of Opsreg Needs in Both Countries 
Date Identified :                           Date Reported:  
Update       : 
Risk          : Operation Requirements (Opsreq) needs in both countries 
Description: Opsreq differences must be met 
by industry with mutually agreed technology. 
 
Consequence: There are 2 (two) designs 
according to their individual requirements, 
need to be guarded so as not to operate 
separately. 
Risk Level :  
Main Executor: PT.DI 
Leader: Government 
Source: Writer’s Deduction 
 
At the TDP stage, the Air Force 
and ROKAF have met each other to 
discuss the compromise of the opsreq, 
the difference of needs between the 
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two countries can be unified, but there 
are 3 (three) fundamental differences 
that cannot be united as a unique 
requirement. This is due to the 
geographical conditions of each 
country, the difference in terms of 
purpose in building fighter aircraft and 
export license problems.   
First, Indonesia needs a combat 
range of about 450 miles due to its vast 
territory, while South Korea as a 
peninsula country wants a shorter 
radius of about 300 miles so that with 
the technology used, engineers must 
be able to meet the opsreq's 
distinction. As a solution the engineers 
prepare external tanks on different 
aircraft (external tankers) for both 
countries as per their respective radius 
requirements.  
Secondly, Indonesia needs a 
parachute (drag chute) which is an 
umbrella component that is located on 
the tail of the plane (tailboom) to 
shorten the landing roll by braking on 
used combat aircraft. It is usually done 
on a short runway. The airstrips in 
Indonesia are generally short, in 
contrast to South Korea whose long 
airstrips are above 3000 meters so they 
do not require drag chute. 
Thirdly, Indonesia wants 
refueling as used on Sukhoi Aircraft or 
European planes with 'probe and 
drogue' system with its fuel 
distribution using a rigid pipe 
shuttlecock badminton. Unlike the 
South Koreans who want the aircraft to 
use the system of 'boom and receiver' 
or flying boom with the distribution of 
fuel through a rigid pipe with a camera 
system controlled by two small wings 
on a tanker that is above the fighter 
through the tank, as on the plane F-16 
or US Aircraft.  
In order to overcome the 
opsreq issues concerning this 
technology, strict supervision must be 
made by the government especially 
regarding differences of interest 
because the greatest probability level 
that can thwart the course of the 
program as a whole does not lie in the 
difference in capability between 
Indonesia and South Korea, Countries 
in developing this aircraft, for 
example; The existence of unique 
requirements and the different 
development goals of the aircraft. 
Indonesia's goal is to achieve self-
defense industry independence, while 
South Korea's goal is to self-defense 
from North Korean attacks. 
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These differences can lead to 
dispute, although the differences 
regarding opsreq have been addressed 
by both, but must be guarded in the 
practice of implementation.  
Supervision should continue to 
be undertaken to oversee the political 
climate and the flexibility of political 
relations and other aspects. For its 
preventive action, Indonesia and South 
Korea should have 1 (one) vision to 
jointly build the interests of the two 
countries so as to not only maintain 
intergovernmental relations (G to G), 
but they also have to control the two 
countries' Combat KFX/IFX (G to B). 
In this case, South Korea is organically 
established by DAPA.  
While Indonesia has not been 
as such that KKIP is expected to play 
that role and to safeguard the 
advancement of the defense industry 
well, KKIP can learn much from the 
experience of DAPA who is able to 
release South Korea's dependence on 
the United States in fulfillment of its 
necessities. 
To maintain cooperation with 
South Korea at the Government level, 
Indonesia should be able to fulfill all 
agreements by its stages. And if the 
two countries have agreed, must 
always be led by the process 
mechanism to be thorough and 
successful both from the level of inter-
government and industry involved 
between the two countries (KAI and 
PT.DI) in particular to avoid dispute 
due to differences.  
In order to achieve a common 
vision, the two countries can instill a 
sense of 'we feeling' because if both 
countries share the same feeling, 
strong comradice and benefit so that it 
can be a glue to dilute disputes both at 
the government level and at the 
industry level.  
Feelings 'we feeling' can be 
developed with intense 
communication and improved 
facilities that encourage the 
occurrence. The intensity of 
communication between elite and non-
elite, or elites and non-elites of other 
countries, the interaction of 
communications become more 
dynamic between Government to 
Government (G to G), Business to 
Business (B to B) and People to People 
(P to P). 
However, the implementation 
of the concept of 'we feel' is not as easy 
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as turning the palm of the hand so it 
needs support from all parties, 
especially the readiness of the 
executor.  
Building together with South 
Korea is done incrementally or 
gradually, starting from cultural 
adaptation and work ethic first. 
Indonesian workers should start 
getting used to working together with 
all these differences. If our personnel 
have been trained with such 
cooperation pattern, then this joint 
development project will be successful 
in the future. 
The key is to recognize the 
cooperation partners from the 
experience of working with South 
Korea before. The author prepares a 
handling plan for Opsreq needs in both 
countries as in Table 7.
Table 7. Abatement Plan for Opsreq Needs in Both Countries 
No Activity Executor Challenges Development 
1. Apply the chosen 
technology to 
answer the different 
needs of opsreq 
PT.DI andKAI There are three  
differences that can 
not be put together 
Made 2 (two) 
designs to meet their 
individual needs 
2. Conduct strict 
supervision 
Government Is not yet going well Supervision 
conducted at G to G 
and G to B levels 
3. Good relationships 
with partners  
PT.DI Not familiar with 
cultural differences 
or cooperation 
patterns 
Approach to cultural 
adaptation and 
understand the 
characteristics of the 
pattern of 
cooperation with 
South Korea 
Source: Writer’s Deduction 
 
Conclusion 
Using the Delphi survey 
method through expert judgment and 
correlated with the real situation 
occurring at the EMDP Stage and the 
development milestone of the 
KFX/IFX Combat Aircraft it was 
found that the dominant risk or the 
highest was technological aspect. 
Conclusion of this study include: 
1. From the economic point of view 
there are 2 (two) issues that are 
found as risk estimates, namely 
the availability of budget and the 
lack of coordination among 
Ministries or Institutions that 
could impact on the delay of this 
program.  
2. In terms of procurement 
organization, there is 1 (one) 
subject matter that is found as risk 
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estimation, that is still lack of 
coordination of ministry or 
institution.  
3. In terms of technology, there are 3 
(three) principal problems 
encountered as risk estimation, 
namely improvement of 
Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL), no Technical Assistance 
Agreement (TAA) approval and 
Operational Requirement 
(Opsreq) needs in both countries 
as unique requirement.  
Recommendation 
The national program of IFX 
fighter development is also very 
important for the establishment of 
defence industry independence and 
opens the road map of the mastery of 
aircraft technology for PT. Dirgantara 
Indonesia (PT.DI).  
For optimal achievement, all 
parties needs to support this KFX/IFX 
Combat development project to run 
well and can be completed in 
accordance with a predetermined 
schedule. The authors provide advice 
and inputs especially for the 
government to conduct a series of 
intense approaches in order to 
strengthen diplomatic relations with 
South Korea and the United States. 
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